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3The present paper seeks to understand more about categorisation and its relation to naming. A patient
with language impairments (LEW) was examined in a three-part investigation of his ability to make
classification decisions. The first part demonstrated LEWÕs inability to make taxonomic classifications
of shape thus confirming his previously documented impaired perceptual categorisation. The second
part demonstrated that, despite LEWÕs inability to perform simple taxonomic classifications, he could
reason analogically as well as a 4/5 year-old child. It is therefore argued that taxonomic classifications
cannot be driven by the development of analogical reasoning. The third part more directly contrasted
thematic and taxonomic classification. LEW showed a preference for thematic classification. In fact,
there was no evidence of any substantial ability to make taxonomic colour classifications despite
evidence for good preservation of the associated object-colour knowledge.
4The inability to carry out tasks requiring categorisation is a common consequence of aphasia (Vignolo,
1999). Therefore, it is not a surprise that categorisation tasks historically assumed considerable
importance for the study of aphasia. In particular, impairments on categorisation tasks were considered
crucial to the debate concerning the relationship between impaired language and thought. Different
opinions were strongly expressed in the early days of modern neuropsychological research. Wernicke,
for example, considered aphasia a disorder of the Wortklangbild (image of the sound of words) -what
we would call now a lexical impairment. Contrary to Wernicke (1874), Hughlings Jackson (1879)
famously declared that aphasics were Òlame in thinkingÓ. The argument was considered one of the most
crucial in neuropsychology and surfaced many times in the subsequent 100 years (Marie, 1906; Head,
1926; Goldstein, 1948; Geschwind, 1974; Vignolo, 1999).
On the view that related aphasia to conceptual impairment, the two disorders have been seen to
variously derive from a more general impairment in the use of symbols (Finkelnburg, 1870 see Vignolo,
1999), or from impaired abstraction and categorisation capacity (Goldstein, 1924, 1948; Teuber and
Weinstein, 1956). Indeed, Goldstein (1948) considered that a loss of abstract processing could explain
impairments in all categorisation tasks (for a comprehensive recent review of his work see Noppeney &
Wallesch, 2000). Goldstein (1948) remarked on the particular difficulty amnesic (anomic) aphasics
show when categorisation requires the ability to think abstractly. The present study is an attempt to
elaborate the position put forward by Goldstein and, in particular, to examine the categorisation of an
aphasic patient (LEW) who has difficulty in naming objects. In examining that position, we will
predominantly contrast types of classification task rather than types of object-knowledge. The latter
tasks are frequently used in the approach to aphasic conditions that could be considered the modern
counterpart of the position held by Wernicke. For some recent empirical work in that tradition,
5examining aphasic patients in picture-word matching tasks, see Chertkow, Bub, Deaudon and
Whitehead (1997).
The categorisation tasks employed by Goldstein were used in a few subsequent studies. For example, De
Renzi et al  (1972) asked patients to sort skeins of coloured wool in the classical Holmgren Test. They
were able to rule out performance on the Weigl test as a predictor of the ability to categorise colours.
However, they concluded that the Òreason for aphasicsÕ poor performance is not clear (p 147)Ó. Impaired
categorisation was also restricted to anomic aphasia by Caramazza and colleagues (Whitehouse,
Caramazza & Zurif, 1978; Caramazza, Berndt & Brownell, 1982). While BrocaÕs aphasics had no
difficulty with a categorisation task, anomic aphasics were substantially impaired (Whitehouse et al,
1978). Similarly, in the task of discriminating between a cup and a bowl (Labov, 1973), Caramazza et al
(1982) found that anomic aphasics were impaired and relied on the crude visual similarity of the
presence or absence of a handle to make categorical judgements. Caramazza et al (1982) commented
that Òthe strongest statement that can be made at this time is that the type of semantically based deficit
we have uncovered appears to be associated with some types of posterior pathology, but not with all
posterior lesions (p186)Ó.
A little more progress on clarifying the limits of categorisation in anomic aphasia was made by
Roberson, Davidoff and Braisby (1999). In their examination of the conceptual abilities of LEW,
Roberson et al noted two contrasting patterns of performance. Whereas, the patient was able to divide
objects by some categorisation instructions, he seemed unable to do so, and even bewildered by others.
The categorisation task at which LEW succeeded was where he was asked to sort pictures of animals
into those that were foreign from those that were British. His excellent performance on this
categorisation task was accompanied by failure at perceptual categorisation tasks (sorting colours and
facial expressions) into as many groups as he thought appropriate. These apparently easy perceptual
6tasks he found extremely difficult despite his excellent colour vision, acuity and otherwise excellent
comprehension (see Druks & Shallice, 2000). Roberson et al ruled out two alternative explanations of
LEWÕs failure at perceptual categorisation. First, the failure was not one of capacity limitation. For
example, it was not confined to colour categories that required sorting on the three dimensions of hue,
brightness and saturation. LEW was also unable to sort colours that differed simply by hue. Second, his
failure was not due to his weakened visual short-term memory.
The apparently simple tasks of colour sorting completely defeated LEW unless the stimuli were
arranged so that categorisation could be achieved by his intact perceptual (colour) discrimination. Thus,
if colour samples were presented for which the within-group similarity was much greater than the
between-group similarity (i.e., narrow ranges of reds, greens, yellows and blues), he sorted them into
four groups without error. Nevertheless, his performance was abnormal because he used a slow pairwise
comparison for each stimulus; the colour groups did not Òpop-outÓ. His abject failure was for tasks
where within-group colours had a wide range of lightness and saturation; in those situations, assessing
visual similarity is extremely difficult. In any case, even if LEW could have computed visual similarity,
it is not a procedure that would have resulted in normal colour categories. In terms of perceptual
discrimination (calculated from CIE co-ordinates see Wyszecki & Stiles, 1982), a colour that we call
pink could be closer to a colour we call yellow than to a colour we would call red.
The failure of LEW at perceptual categorisation tasks is extremely important and leads directly to the
present wider examination of his classification ability. Despite what might appear otherwise, the critical
aspect of perceptual categorisation is that it depends on language. To understand the connection, it is
necessary to realise that the difficulties LEW showed for perceptual categorisation are totally
compatible with the philosophical position concerning, what is called, ÒvaguenessÓ (Osherson & Smith,
1997). Vagueness is inherent in tasks that ask for categorisation from continuous variables because they
7fundamentally reduce the ways in which categorisation can be achieved (Dummett, 1975; Wright,
1975). Dummett (1975) holds what might be thought to be an extreme position but it is one from which
we want to argue.
Dummett contended that purely perceptual categories are an impossibility because categorisation from
continuously varying stimuli cannot be achieved solely by perceptual means. If purely perceptual
categories were possible, it would imply that colour is immune to what is classically known as the
Sorites paradox; it is not. The paradox becomes apparent from a thought experiment. Suppose we alter a
colour (say, one that we would call red) by imperceptibly reducing the wavelength. We would be forced
to call the second colour by the same name (i.e., red). The process could then be repeated by again
reducing the wavelength by an imperceptible amount. Again, we would have to admit that the third
colour should be given the same name as the second. Continuing this procedure many times, one would
have to finally, and paradoxically, admit that blue colours should be called red. According to Dummett,
this paradox can only be avoided by introducing some non-perceptual mechanism (e.g., names or rules)
into the categorisation process. Thus, we would argue that colour categorisation is essentially a rule-
governed procedure. Colours may be assigned to a category on the basis of similarity but it is similarity
to an arbitrarily defined (named) colour (see Roberson et al, 1999).
The present sets of investigations will consider the Jackson/Goldstein position that the aphasic patient
has lost the ability to think abstractly. In particular, we will consider LEWÕs ability to achieve
taxonomic classifications. Thus, we will give LEW tasks that tap the distinction between rule-based
(taxonomic) and associative (thematic) learning systems (Sloman, 1996). Rule-based systems operate on
symbolic structures whereas associative systems reflect the similarity structure of acquired knowledge
and relations of temporal and spatial contiguity. The two types of classification directly relate to a
distinction between abstract and concrete thought processes (Goldstein, 1948).
8Our new investigation is in three parts. In all parts, we will give LEW tasks that tap the distinction
between rule-based and associative (thematic) learning systems (Sloman, 1996). The first part of the
investigation confirms LEWÕs status as having difficulty with taxonomic (rule-based) classification for
continuously varying stimuli. The previous examples of his difficulty with colour categorisation are
supplemented by evidence of his impairment in shape categorisation. The second part concerns different
views that are current for the role of similarity and analogical reasoning in achieving rule-based thought
(Sloman & Rips, 1998; Gentner & Medina, 1998). We investigated analogical reasoning because
Ratterman and Gentner (1998) argued that relational labels invite children to notice patterns and hence
to make analogies or comparisons. It gives evidence for at least some preserved analogical reasoning in
LEW. The view taken in the second part is that the ability to reason by relational alignment (analogies)
is insufficient to explain performance on taxonomic tasks. Thus, we address and question the belief that
the acquisition of rules might be bootstrapped from similarity judgements (Ratterman & Gentner, 1998).
Gentner has argued that language plays a critical part in acquiring rules but it is unclear whether that
should be a necessary part or rather that language directs the childÕs attention to the critical aspects of
the similarity judgement. So, we will assess whether LEWÕs language impairment has affected more
than the taxonomic problem given to him in the colour sorting and facial expression sorting tasks of our
previous study (Roberson et al, 1999). The question that LEW will help address is whether similarity
judgements might be achieved in a patient incapable of making perceptual categorisations. If this can be
shown, then there would be an argument for believing the two types of thought are different in kind. At
least, analogical reasoning would not be sufficient for taxonomic thought.
The third part of our investigation also concerns the type of thought process that is impaired in LEW.
When LEW succeeded on sorting tasks such as dividing animals into British vs foreign, he was asked
how he did the task. His answer was ÒzooÓ. If by ÒzooÓ he meant that these animals were found in a zoo,
his thought process was of an associative type. Is he, therefore, like children in biasing his sorting by
9thematic rather than taxonomic cues? Taxonomic categories are here defined as rule-based
categorisation. Taxonomies are often considered as hierarchies of classification (Murphy, 2002) but
taxonomies defined simply as rules for class determination is more appropriate to the distinctions made
in development (Smiley & Brown, 1979; Markman & Hutchison, 1984) upon which we base our
investigation. Markman (1989; Markman & Hutchison, 1984) has shown that two- and three-year-old
children do not have a natural bias to sort taxonomically. Instead, without a noun prompt, children have
a tendency to make a thematic choice.
In this section, we will also show that apparently similar categorisation tasks (object-colour, object-size)
may be failed or passed according to whether they can be accomplished without taxonomic
classification. Furthermore, we will show that, in LEWÕs case, failure at object-colour classification
tasks does not result from a loss of knowledge about object-colour (Lewandowsky, 1908/Davidoff &
Fodor, 1989; Luzzatti & Davidoff, 1994; Miceli et al, 2001).
LEW
LEWÕs neuropsychological and clinical profiles have been documented elsewhere (Roberson et al,
1999; Druks & Shallice, 2000). In brief, he had a stroke that left him with a moderate right-sided motor
weakness and close to the profile of high-level WernickeÕs aphasia. LEW had modest formal education,
leaving school at 14 years. Druks and Shallice (2000) reported his current Verbal IQ as 71 and his
Performance IQ as 83. On the spoken presentation of the word/picture matching task of the PALPA
(Kay, Lesser& Coltheart, 1992), he scored 33/40 when examined by Druks and Shallice (2000); on our
re-testing, his performance was very similar scoring 35/40 at the beginning of testing and 37/40 when
re-tested a year later.
LEW is severely anomic and it is his naming to visually presented stimuli that is the main interest for
the current investigation. He was tested with several stimulus sets by Druks and Shallice (2000). He
scored 11% and 26% correct respectively on two administrations of the 60 object PALPA set and 16%
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correct on 90 common household objects. He was similarly impaired on naming verbs (actions in
pictures) scoring 9% and 20 % correct. Druks and Shallice (2000) report LEW to be substantially better
at naming to definition.
In the current testing, LEW showed again very limited ability to produce a name to a visually presented
stimulus. He scored only 2/30 on the Graded Naming Test (McKenna & Warrington, 1983). There was
no evidence of category preservation; LEW correctly named only 1/30 fruit and vegetables, 2/30 non-
praxic objects, 0/30 praxic objects and 4/30 animals from the McKenna (1997) corpus. In line with the
testing in Roberson et al (1999), LEW only named 1/11 basic colours correctly. His correct response
was 'blue'; to the others, his responses were  "I know it but can't say". He pointed to 7/11 correctly
making the following errors: yellow for white; black for brown; blue for grey and green for blue.
LEW was given the full set of objects (nouns) and verbs from Druks and Masterson (2000). The test
allows analysis by five variables that have been considered important if semantic deficits underlie
impaired name retrieval. For nouns, he scored 47/162 correct and verbs 17/100 correct with no evidence
of any predictive value (see Table 1) for any of frequency, familiarity, age-of-acquisition, imageability
or visual complexity in analyses of correct and incorrect noun items (F(4,640) < 1) and verb items
(F(4,392) < 1). There was no difference in correct scores for a frequency matched set of 100 nouns and
verbs; chi-sq(1) = 2.36, p > .1. Errors were, as in Druks and Shallice (2000), for nouns, attempts at
circumlocutions, attempts to gesture and occasional semantic errors; for verbs, there were mostly
omissions.
                                Table 1 about here
Part 1: Impaired perceptual categorisation
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Experiment 1: Shape sorting
The influence of naming on shape categorisation was recently investigated by Roberson, Davidoff and
Shapiro (2002). Their task used stimuli taken from Rosch (1973). Rosch argued for a universal basis for
shape categorisation from the relative ease that names were associated to ÒbasicÓ shapes by speakers of
a language that possessed no shape terms. Roberson et al (2002) were unable to replicate RoschÕs main
findings with speakers of a different language that also contains no shape terms. As part of that study,
Roberson et al gave RoschÕs stimuli to their subjects with the instructions to sort them into groups. The
speakers of the language without shape terms found the task very difficult and were unwilling to see the
stimuli as similar in the same way as controls.
Controls
Ten male controls without brain damage who were matched for age and academic background.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of three prototypes (square, circle and triangle) and six transformations on each
taken from Rosch (1973). The stimuli are shown in Figure 1. The same transformations were performed
on each prototype.
                                         Figure 1 about here
Procedure
The 21 stimuli were arranged at random on a table in front of LEW and he was instructed to put them
into groups. As he did not spontaneously put them into three groups, the stimuli were rearranged and he
was instructed to make three groups. He was then instructed to make three groups each being made up
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only of circles, triangles or squares. The instructions to the controls were identical except that the testing
was discontinued if they made three groups each of only one shape.
Results
LEW was again bewildered by the task. Initially, he picked up one of the circles and found four other
circles that he considered should go with it. He then declared that all the rest should be considered
another group. His response to the instruction to form three groups was similar. He formed one group of
three circles. He then formed another group of three circles and a triangle, then declared that all the rest
of the stimuli should be allocated to the third group. LEW was most uncertain when asked to make
groups only of squares, triangles and circles. He made one group of 4 circles another of 3 squares and a
triangle; the third group contained 6 triangles and two squares. He refused to classify, despite repeated
requests, 3 of the circles and 2 of the squares.
Rather to our surprise, only two of the controls spontaneously sorted the shapes into the three groups as
designated by Rosch (1973). The others sorted the shapes into 4-7 piles. On being requested to sort the
shapes into only three groups, all but one control made the groups as designated by Rosch (1973). The
deviant control still continued to make groups containing stimuli of all three shapes. However, on being
asked to group the stimuli into squares, circles and triangles, his sorting was without error.
Given our matched controls natural disinclination to sort the shapes as designated by Rosch, we ran 10
further controls from an undergraduate population. Only three of the controls spontaneously sorted the
shapes into the three groups. The number of groups, for the other controls ranged from four to six with
only around half of the groups containing all the same shape type. Nevertheless, on being instructed to
form three groups, all 10 controls showed errorless performance. Controls were asked to explain their
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initial groupings and many said that the task looked so simple that they thought  Ò it must be a trick
taskÓ.
Experiment 2: Implicit shape categorisation
In Roberson et al (1999), LEW was found to have implicit knowledge of colour boundaries despite his
inability to make use of them to sort colours. A task taken from Sophian (2000) was used to investigate
whether LEW also had implicit knowledge of shape. The original intention was to use the within- vs
cross-category distinction to assess shape recognition as used for colours in Roberson et al (1999). In
that task, implicit categories were established for LEW by his superior recognition performance with
cross-category distracters. A square was morphed into a triangle but controls refused to allow the equal
morphed steps as psychologically equal. Moreover, controls always judged shapes from the same
category as more similar than any comparison drawn from different categories. The difficulty in making
purely perceptual categories for shapes was thus similar to the difficulty we previously reported for
facial expressions in Roberson et al (1999).
As it would prove little to show that LEW gave superior performance with cross-category stimuli if they
could not be perceptually matched to within-category alternatives, we turned to a more basic type of
shape similarity. It would appear that we understand the similarity of shapes transformed by scale
without the allocation of attentional resources (Biederman & Cooper, 1992; Stankiewicz & Hummel,
2002).  We therefore argued that if LEW could assess the similarity between shapes that varied in scale,
then he demonstrated at least some (implicit) understanding of shape. The task employed was that used
by Sophian (2000) with 4-to-5 year-old children.
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Procedure
A rectangle was presented at the top of a sheet of paper and two further rectangles at the bottom. One of
the lower rectangles was an exact copy of the original but scaled down by 1/3 and the other matched the
scaled-down replica on one dimension (height or width) but had a height/width ratio either greater or
smaller than the original.
Sets were made up following the criteria of Sophian (2000). There were 4 'close contrast' pairs with a
smaller distracter ratio, 4 'close contrast' pairs with a larger distracter ratio, 4 'far contrast' pairs with a
smaller distracter ratio and 4 'far contrast' pairs with a larger distracter ratio. In 'close contrast' pairs, the
distracter had a height/width ratio either 2/3 as large or 4/3  as large as the target. In 'far contrast' pairs
the distracter had a height/width ratio either 1/2 as large or 2/1  as large as the target.
Sophian (2000) provided children with a story to encourage matching. LEW was given instructions for
the task directly asking him to say which items had the same shape.
Results
LEW scored 16/16 correct. Thus, under direct perceptual matching conditions he can accurately decide
which non-identical stimulus matched the target stimulus exactly in shape. Once again, he succeeded at
a task when his knowledge is accessed implicitly but, as Experiment 1 showed, failed when asked to
make an explicit categorisation in the same domain.
Overview Part 1
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Experiment 1 provided further evidence that LEW is incapable of making explicit categorisation of
stimuli that he cannot name. In Roberson et al (1999), we showed that he could not sort colours, now we
show that he also cannot sort shapes. However, as reported for colour in Roberson et al (1999),
Experiment 2 showed that LEW does have some implicit understanding of shape categories. Why these
aspects are not available to him in explicit tasks remains to be discovered.
Despite the fact that we used the most common geometric shapes (squares, circles and triangles) as our
stimuli, LEW did not seem able to show any explicit understanding of their taxonomy. His performance
gives further evidence against the view that these basic shape categories are innately prescribed as
suggested by Rosch (1973). LEWÕs data rather support the view, driven by cross-lingual evidence
(Roberson et al, 2002), that shape categories are organised with respect to the meaning ascribed by the
shape terms of the speakerÕs language.
Somewhat as a surprise, age and educationally matched controls also showed some disinclination to sort
RoschÕs shapes into three groups. Even undergraduates were inclined to make more than three groups
though here it was because they thought that the three-group allocation was too obvious. The controlsÕ
performance shows that a sorting task is, as Goodman (1972) warned, inherently open-ended. Indeed,
our stimuli provide rather good evidence for WittgensteinÕs (1953) stricture (see Gentner & Medina,
1998) that Òwhat counts as the same or similar cannot be established independently of our rule-governed
behaviourÓ.
Part 2: Preserved analogical reasoning
In Part 2, we ascertain the status of LEWÕs analogical reasoning in the context of his impaired
taxonomic classification shown in Part 1 and in Roberson et al (1999). We investigated analogical
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reasoning because Ratterman and Gentner (1998) argued that relational labels invite children to notice
patterns and hence to make comparisons. Thus, they argued that language also encourages a
modification of thinking for this type of task. Gentner argues (Namy & Gentner, 2002) that hearing
common labels asks children to embark on a comparison that helps promote abstract thought.
The age at which analogical reasoning develops and is affected by labels is greater than that currently
found for the acquisition of colour labels (Davidoff, 1991; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998). So, it might be
a reasonable assumption that, as LEW cannot make use of colour labels, he would also not be able to
make use of relational labels. However, as we inferred above, there are different views as to whether the
similarity judgements used in analogical reasoning are the same as those required for rule-based thought
(Sloman & Rips, 1998, Gentner & Medina, 1998).
In Experiment 3, LEW was given a close version of the tasks used by Ratterman and Gentner (1998).
The subsequent two experiments consider potential artefacts that could have allowed him success at the
analogical reasoning tasks.
Experiment 3: Analogical judgements and the role of labels
Experiment 3 was directed by Rattermann and GentnerÕs finding that young children have greater
difficulty making choices based on relational size (e.g., the smallest item in a set) with rich objects
(varying on many dimensions, including size) than with sparse objects (varying only in size). Young
children (3 and 4-years-old) were unable to resist matching by overall object similarity, rather than
relational size. Not until 5 years of age were children able to overcome the temptation to match objects
and choose by relational similarity.  However, younger children made more relational choices when
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prompted with the labels ÔbigÕ, ÔlittleÕ, ÔtinyÕ or ÔmommyÕ, ÔdaddyÕ, ÔbabyÕ. In Experiment 3, LEW was
tested on his ability to make relational matches for sets of rich or sparse stimuli that he was unable to
name, both without labels and with the ÒfamilyÓ labels: ÔmummyÕ, ÔdaddyÕ, ÔbabyÕ. Subsequently, he
was also tested with ÒsizeÓ labels: ÔbigÕ, Ômiddle sizedÕ and ÔsmallÕ.
Stimuli
Two sets of stimuli were created following Rattermann and Gentner (1998). Rich stimulus sets
contained three objects that varied along multiple dimensions including size within the two sets (e.g., a
large black hat, a medium sized red rose and a small white door). Sparse stimulus sets contained three
simple sparse objects that were identical in all respects except size within the two sets (e.g., patterned
squares). See Figure 2 for examples of rich and sparse sets. In both cases, the size of stimuli was in
monotonic order, from smallest to largest.
                                         Figure 2 about here
LEW was asked to map monotonic changes in size between a triad of objects in front of the
experimenter and a triad of objects in front of him. A cross-mapping was created by staggering the sizes
of the objects as illustrated in Figure 2, where objects, change monotonically in size from left to right.
Procedure and Rationale
The experimenter and LEW sat opposite each other and the experimenter explained ÒIÕm going to point
to one of the three things on my card while you watch me. If you think about the thing IÕm pointing to,
youÕll be able to guess which is the equivalent one in your set.Ó  If LEW were to use a relational rule to
make his decision, when the experimenter pointed to the middle object in her set, LEW should also
choose the middle object. However, if LEWÕs decisions were based on overall similarity, then he would
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choose the object on the left (the smallest object).  Feedback was either Òyes, thatÕs the oneÓ or Òno, I
was thinking of another oneÓ.
In the first part of Experiment 3, no labels for the stimuli were given. There were 12 trials for each set of
stimuli. LEW completed all 24 trials on 4 different occasions. In the second part of Experiment 3, on
separate occasions, LEW was given ÒfamilyÓ labels for the stimuli. Following Rattermann and Gentner
(1998), the experimenter used the labels ÒdaddyÓ, ÒmummyÓ, ÒbabyÓ to label the large, medium and
small stimuli. The experimenter again sat opposite LEW with a card from each set between them. The
experimenter explained ÒIÕm going to point to the daddy/mummy/baby object on my card while you
watch me. Can you find the daddy/mummy/baby one in your set?Ó In all other ways, the procedure for
the second part of the experiment was the same as for the first part.
On further subsequent occasions, LEW was tested with the ÒsizeÓ labels: ÔbigÕ, Ômiddle sizedÕ and
ÔsmallÕ. The experimenter again sat opposite LEW with a card from each set between them. The
experimenter explained ÒIÕm going to point to the big/middle sized/small thing on my card while you
watch me. Can you find the big/middle sized/small one in your set?Ó The procedure was again similar
except that the testing was in three sessions with a total of 36 trials/condition.
Results
Table 2 shows results for LEW for sparse and rich stimuli with and without labels compared to those
made by 3, 4 and 5-year-olds in Rattermann and Gentner (1998).    LEW performed above chance in all
conditions. In the no label condition, his scores resembled those of 4- and 5-year-old children though his
better performance in the sparse condition did not reach reliable levels (chi-sq (1) = 2.92, p  = .135 (two-
tailed). LEW did not show the same pattern of improvement that Ratterman and Gentner (1998) found
for 3-year-olds when prompted with ÒfamilyÓ labels. LEW seemed confused by the labels ÒdaddyÓ,
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ÒmummyÓ, ÒbabyÓ in that these resulted in decreased (albeit not reliably so) performance. However,
with size labels, LEWÕs performance improved in both conditions. For the sparse condition, ceiling
effects prevented a significant improvement (chi-sq (1) = 2.13, p  = .145 (two-tailed) but not for the rich
condition (chi-sq (1) = 5.17, p  = .023 (two-tailed).  For the rich condition, errors were always to the
identical object; this was also the predominant error in the sparse condition.
                                        Table 2 about here
Discussion
Overall, LEW showed a similar pattern of performance to that of young children, and the addition of
meaningful labels for stimuli induced a similar increment in performance. Ratterman and Gentner
(1998) suggested that children succeeded with plain stimuli because they had some understanding of the
relative size of objects, but failed on the complex set because the object identity match over-rode the
relative size match. The same explanation could well hold for LEW. However, in reviewing LEWÕs
pattern of performance, it was wondered whether two alternative explanations might be offered for the
occasions where he failed to reason analogically. First, with the rich set of stimuli, the real life size of
the objects might have caused LEW to make the wrong judgement where it conflicted with the relative
size of the pictures (e.g., because a house is larger than a rose). Second, with the sparse set of stimuli, as
they were always in monotonic order, he could have succeeded in the task by selecting the stimulus in
the same position as that in the experimenterÕs set, without having a real understanding of the relative
size of the objects. Ratterman and Gentner (1998) do not discuss this second possibility but it would
seem a potential strategy that could be adopted for the task.
Experiment 4: Analogical reasoning with abstract shapes
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To rule out the first of these alternative explanations for LEWÕs success at the analogical reasoning task,
a set of abstract plain and coloured stimuli were created for Experiment 4 such that the coloured stimuli
were multi-coloured and had complex abstract shapes.  Examples of the stimuli are shown in Figure 3.
                                  Figure 3 about here
Stimuli and Procedure
Cards were made up of a similar size to those used in Experiment 3 and presentation conditions were
identical to those in the no-label condition in that Experiment.
Results
LEW was above chance in all conditions. LEW made few errors in the sparse condition scoring 81%
correct, he scored 63% in the rich condition; this difference approached reliability (chi-sq (1) = 4.17, p =
.068 (two-tailed). Errors were again to point to the identical object.
Discussion
LEW continued to be worse at the complex task even with abstract stimuli for which he could have no
existing size representation - suggesting that his poorer performance on the original rich set in
Experiment 3 was not due to confusion over the real-life size of objects.
Experiment 5: Analogical reasoning with non-monotonic stimuli
A further test was carried out, using the stimuli used in Experiment 3 taken from Ratterman and Gentner
(1998), to examine the effect of using a non-monotonic order of presentation.
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Procedure
The procedure was similar to that of the no-label condition of Experiment 3 except that LEWÕs and the
experimenterÕs stimuli were presented in non-monotonic order. Testing was confined to one session for
the rich stimuli and three sessions for the sparse stimuli.
Results
LEW was above chance in all conditions. For the sparse set of stimuli, LEW made 75% correct choices,
for the rich set he made 56% correct choices; clearly a similar pattern of performance to that found in
Experiment 3 (see Table 2) with the original monotonic order.
Overview Part 2
In all of the experimental conditions LEW performed well above chance. He is able to reason
analogically at least to the ability of a 4/5 year-old child and does not make all judgements on the basis
of perceptual similarity between objects. Indeed, LEW showed evidence of analogical reasoning even
with randomly arranged stimuli, he is not any worse with abstract rather than real-life stimuli and he can
improve on the tasks with the assistance of (some) labels. However, like children, his analogical
reasoning can get confused by complex stimuli and can be distracted by object similarity. Yet, there is
no doubt that a 4/5 year-old child could sort colours.  So, LEWÕs results would imply that the linguistic
abilities required for analogical reasoning are not those required for taxonomic classification.
Our results do not directly assess whether or not relational (analogical) reasoning is primary (Goswami,
1996) or whether it is bootstrapped from similarity judgements (Gentner, 1988). We are more concerned
with whether the use of labels in analogical reasoning serves the same role as in colour sorting and other
taxonomic classifications. In fact, even Ratterman and Gentner (1998) do not wish to claim that
language is Òthe only path to relational competenceÓ. However, they argue that the use of labels is to
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promote alignment on dimensions; this progressive alignment is held to be sufficient for simple
analogical comparisons (Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996). From the performance of LEW, we would argue
that analogical reasoning is an intellectual achievement quite separate from perceptual categorisation.
Thus, analogical reasoning could be merely helped by language (Gentner & Medina, 1998) but, for
perceptual categorisation, language is essential. Our results would favour that interpretation giving
language a unique role only in taxonomic classification.
Part 3 Taxonomic vs Thematic Classification
In Part 2, we argued for a distinction between rule-based and similarity-based reasoning. In Part 3, we
make a similar distinction between rule-based and thematic associations. The distinction is not new; it is
not even new for considerations of aphasic patients. WernickeÕs aphasics have long been known to have
difficulty with conceptual as opposed to thematic relationships (Bisiacchi, Denes & Semenza, 1976;
Gardner & Zurif, 1976; Melice-Ledent et al, 1976; Semenza et al, 1980) and the reverse has been
claimed for more anterior patients (Semenza, Bisiacchi & Romani, 1992). However, the particular
difficulty in making conceptual classifications is not restricted to WernickeÕs aphasics. Even with an
intact ability to make conceptual classifications, patients might prefer to classify thematically (as for
example in Zurif et al, 1974). Nevertheless, Semenza (1999) concluded that it is patients with lesions
located more posteriorly in the left hemisphere that are significantly more likely to have problems with
conceptual classification
Semenza (1999) argues for the importance of intact classification for good naming.
However, Goodglass and Baker (1976) found superordinate classification resistant to damage in
aphasics with naming disorders. Semenza argues that task difficulty was not controlled in Goodglass
and Baker and, if this is controlled, a clear double dissociation is shown between the two tasks. Indeed,
Semenza et al (1992) demonstrated that there was a direct relationship between the ability to use nouns
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and the ability to form a category irrespective of the aphasic classification of the patient (see also
Wayland & Taplin, 1982; Gainotti et al, 1986). Furthermore, good naming ability did not necessarily
imply intact semantic representations.
We will examine LEWÕs performance on two tasks (classification by similarity or by name, and odd-
one-out) that while asking for taxonomic decisions are, in part, potentially soluble by thematic
associations. The line of investigation began as a result of asking LEW to sort items from the Snodgrass
and Vanderwart (1980) corpus into animals, furniture and clothes. He had performed flawlessly at the
apparently more difficult task of dividing animals into ÒBritishÓ vs ÒforeignÓ, so we expected the task to
be carried out without error. Indeed, he made no mistakes with the animals but several items of furniture
were placed with clothes. In a repetition of the task, where the labels ÒfurnitureÓ and ÒclothesÓ were
explicitly given to LEW, similar mistakes still occurred pointing to a difference between this case and
what one might expect if the problem was a visual-verbal disconnection as might occur in optic aphasia.
Experiment 6: Classification by similarity or by name
The task was based on Experiments 1-3 of Markman and Hutchinson (1984). In these experiments, they
investigated the young childÕs bias towards memory structures based on thematic rather than taxonomic
associations (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964; Smiley & Brown, 1979). Markman and Hutchinson (1984)
investigated whether hearing a novel or basic level name (Rosch et al, 1976) would cause children to
shift from thematic to taxonomic classification. For simple tasks such as those in Markman and
Hutchinson, adults make taxonomic choices but even children as old as six might prefer thematic
choices as, in fact, adults may do if a task is difficult or items strongly associated (Smiley & Brown,
1979; Lin & Murphy, 2001). In our experiment with LEW, we considered only the difference between a
condition where no name was given compared to that of being given the basic level name.
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Controls
Twelve male adults slightly older than LEW but with the same educational background (mean age =
68.5 years, SD = 6.78 years) were used as controls.
Stimuli
Twenty-two triads were constructed closely based on the stimuli in Experiments 1-2 in Markman and
Hutchinson (1984). Each triad consisted of three coloured photographs of common objects arranged to
form a triangle. A standard object (e.g., police car, tennis shoe) was placed at the top of the triangle and
a taxonomic choice (e.g., saloon car, high-heeled shoe) or thematic choice (e.g., policeman, foot) placed
at the two lower apices. The taxonomic choice was to the left of the standard for half the triads and to
the right for the other half.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two sessions (No Word and Basic Word) administered on different days.
The No Word condition was given first. Pointing at the standard object, LEW was instructed Òto find
another one the same as thisÓ. The same procedure was given in the Basic Word condition except that
LEW was told Òthis is a car (shoe etc). Can you find another one?Ó
Results
In the No Word condition, LEW made 16/22 thematic choices. In the Basic Word condition, LEW made
4/22 thematic choices. A McNemar test for the significance of changes gave Chi-sq (1) = 11.08, p <
.001. Controls made very few thematic choices (on average 2.25 thematic choices in the No Word
Condition and 0.33 thematic choices in the Basic Word Condition).  Six controls made no thematic
choices in the No Word Condition and 9 none in the Basic Word Condition. LEW made more thematic
choices than controls in both conditions (both ps < .001).
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Discussion
LEWÕs scores resembled the performance of the 4-year-old children in Markman and Hutchinson (1984,
Experiment 3). Those children made 25% taxonomic choices in the No Word Condition and 62%
taxonomic choices in the Basic Word condition; LEW made 28% in the No Word condition and 82% in
the Basic Word Condition.  Thus, unlike normal adults but like young children, LEW is influenced by
the objectÕs label in making choices in the Markman and Hutchinson task. He is clearly capable of
recognising that visually different exemplars of a category can be given the same name and acting
accordingly in response to the instruction to find another car (shoe) etc. However, Experiment 6 does
not allow us to conclude that LEW is capable of making taxonomic classifications without being given
labels. He can make an apparently taxonomic decision based on the label ÒcarÓ but then his good
performance on the PALPA Test would predict that he could match the word ÒcarÓ to pictures of cars.
He could not do the same for colours and the label ÒredÓ. Therefore, we carried out Experiment 7 where
the classification was based on three different (colour, size and function) object properties that have an
increasing likelihood of allowing a thematic solution to an odd-one-out decision.
Experiment 7: Odd-one-out Tasks
The task used in Experiment 7 asks for a taxonomic decision in an odd-one-out paradigm. LEW could
sort pictures of animals into ÒBritishÓ vs ÒforeignÓ (Roberson et al, 1999). However, there are reasons to
investigate the intact status of the types of knowledge that might be presumed responsible for his good
performance. The work of the Konstanz group (Cohen et al, 1976; Kelter et al, 1976, Cohen, Kelter &
Woll,  1980; review in Vignolo, 1999) distinguishes between types of categorisation tasks. Their tasks,
similar in design to those used in the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test (Howard & Patterson, 1992), ask
the patient to decide which two out of three pictures go together. They found that aphasic patients were
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considerably more impaired if the connection was ÒperceptualÓ rather than ÒsituationalÓ. For example,
aphasics failed to connect that a snowman should go with a swan because both are white but succeeded
in a task that required putting together a guitar and a bull because both are connected with Spain. Thus,
the Konstanz group made, from many studies, the perhaps rather surprising conclusion that it is visual
knowledge about objects that is impaired in aphasia. In Experiment 7, we consequently contrasted two
aspects of visual knowledge about objects (colour, size) with that of function.
Standardisation of Task
Our examination of LEW employed an odd-one-out task commonly used to assess the status of intact
knowledge (Warrington, 1975). The particular task used with LEW investigated knowledge from both
pictures and words as in Hillis and Caramazza (1995). Stimuli were taken from Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980) and were used both in their pictorial form and as words. Three odd-one-out
conditions were given: colour, size and function. Each stimulus was only used in one task and hence
some preliminary balancing of task difficulty was required.
For standardisation, a trial consisted of three pictures (words) presented on a computer screen at the
apices of an equilateral triangle. The task was standardised by twelve undergraduate control subjects
who were asked to select the picture (word) they believed to be the odd-one-out according to the
condition (colour, size or function) of the experiment. They were asked to respond as accurately and as
quickly as possible. Responses were made via keys arranged in the same pattern as the stimuli on the
screen. Each subject carried out all six conditions with pictures and words blocked. The order of each
condition within each block was controlled. The stimuli within each condition were presented in a
random order.
Latencies were analysed within a Block (Pictures vs Words) x Condition (Colours vs Size vs Function)
analysis of variance. There were no effects that even approached significance. However, a similar
analysis for accuracy revealed an effect of Condition F(2,22 = 7.46, p < .01) due to the relative ease of
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the colour judgement. In consequence, triads were removed from each Condition to balance the level of
accuracy. It was only necessary to remove three triads to ensure that another similar analysis produced
no effects that approached significance. However, to further ensure equivalence, the remaining 21 triads
for each Condition were administered in the same way to a different set of 12 standardisation subjects.
No significant effects were observed for either accuracy or latency. A further analysis incorporating the
order of Block (Picture vs Words) also revealed no significant main effects or interactions.
Controls
The same 12 controls were used as in Experiment 7.
Procedure
Some changes to the procedure were necessary to administer the odd-one-out task to LEW. He was
unable to use the keyboard set-up properly without the use of his right hand, so pictorial stimuli were
presented on cards on a table in front of the patient. The stimuli were in the same pattern as on the
computer screen; accuracy was recorded. A similar procedure was followed for the words but LEWÕs
impaired reading was supplemented by the words being also read aloud by the experimenter who
simultaneously pointed to each word. Controls followed the same procedure except that they read the
words themselves.
The stimuli were divided into two blocks with the pictorial and word form for a particular item in
different blocks. The first block consisted of 10 picture triads and then 11 word triads for colour
followed by the same procedure for size and then function. The second block consisted of 11 words and
then 10 pictures for function followed by the same for size and then colour.  The one hour interval
between blocks was filled with an unrelated task of freesorting facial expressions. At regular intervals
within each condition LEW was reminded of the criterion for deciding which was the odd-one-out.
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Results
LEW showed no evidence that he could judge which object of the triad was a different colour to the
other two (see Table 3). The dramatic difference between Conditions was independent of the form
(picture or words) of presentation. Performance in the colour odd-one-out tasks was at chance and
accordingly worse than the standardisation group (pictures: t(20) = 22.50, p < .001, words: t(20) =
27.50, p < .001) and the controls (ps < .001 for both pictures and words). There was a similar but less
dramatic pattern of performance against the standardisation group for the size judgements (pictures:
t(20) = 12.91, p < .001, words: t(20) = 10.83, p < .001). Comparison to the controls for size judgements
gave a reliable difference for pictures (p < .007) but not for words (p > .05). The pattern for function
judgements was different with LEW not differing from the standardisation group for pictures: t(20) < 1.
He was somewhat impaired on function judgements from words: t(20) = 3.33, p < .01 but not to the
same extent as for colour and size judgements. Against the control group, there was clearly no
difference for either pictures or words (both ps > .1).
                                        Table 3 about here
The data were also inspected to verify whether LEWÕs judgements reflected item difficulty. His good
performance with function items and his poor performance with colour items prohibited any sensible
analysis for those conditions but an analysis was carried out for size. Omitting the middle item, the 21
items were divided into equal groups of easy and difficult items according to controlsÕ performance.
LEW obtained reliably higher scores for the easy items (pictures: Chi-sq (1) = 9.89, p < .01, words: Chi-
sq (1) = 7.50, p < .01).
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Discussion
LEW performed rather badly at the odd-one-out tasks except for function judgements. He was impaired
by much the same extent whether tested from words or pictures (see Hart & Gordon (1990) for a similar
finding in a similar task). However, in the function Condition, his performance did not differ from that
of the controls.
LEW has been previously examined in an investigation of his poor naming (Druks & Shallice, 2000).
As a part of that investigation, his knowledge about living kinds was examined reasonably
comprehensively and LEW found to have to have access to a large amount of associated information.
LEWÕs poor performance on the odd-one-out tasks might seem at variance with those findings.
However, they are not. It is our contention that his extant associated knowledge would not help him in a
task requiring rule-based knowledge. These odd-one-out tasks require the abstraction of a concept; this
is particularly the case for colour  (redness etc). LEW may be able to imagine the colours of the objects
but he cannot name those colours. So, to solve the task, he must allocate the object-colours Ðthat are not
identical- to the same category. As Lange (1936/1988 p88) put the theory of Gelb and GoldsteinÉ. Ò(for
us) The concrete colour ..is not considered separately but Éas representative of a certain colour
category, of redness, yellowness, blueness etc. This conceptual or categorical behaviour is impossible
for the patients.Ó
LEWÕs comprehension was reported to be good (Druks & Shallice, 2000) but there are indications
within their report of somewhat impaired performance that is compatible with our findings on the odd-
one-out task. Object-colour knowledge was not tested but LEW was asked to show on a tape measure
the size of household objects. His overall performance was equivalent to controls but only after
disregarding 10 items for which LEW was clearly deviant. Our task of size judgements would be more
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even likely to produce errors from LEW. In many cases, he could be inclined to perform the judgement
on the basis of largeness or smallness and then he will fail.
The performance on the function odd-one-out task was much better than for size and colour. Evidence
that would support his (lesser) difficulty with the function odd-one-out task can also be found in Druks
and Shallice (2000). In that study, LEW was assessed several times on versions of the Pyramids and
Palm Trees Test. Our own testing of the picture version gave 48/54 (89%) correct; completely in line
with the testing of Druks and Shallice (2000). Though it is easy to disregard these few errors, technically
this is impaired performance. We would maintain that these errors are meaningful and reflect the
number of times idiosynchratic thematic associations might lead LEW to the wrong response. They
remind us of the errors LEW made on the furniture vs clothes sorting task (see above). They are also
similar to observations made by Goldstein (1948). He commented on a patient that put tools (e.g.,
hammer) with kitchen equipment in a categorisation task because they were kept together in his house.
There is a separate aspect of LEWÕs data that requires some comment. His results might be seen as
interpretable within arguments about category specific impairments after brain damage. Given the items
were taken from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart corpus, colour items were predominantly of living kinds
and function items entirely of artefacts; size items were roughly equally of each kind. Such a distinction
might prompt consideration of the data from Warrington and McCarthy (1987) who have argued that
selective impairment for living kind categories could be associated with loss of sensory as opposed to
functional object-knowledge. It is important to stress that the results for LEW on the odd-one-out tasks
should not be seen as demonstration of a category specific knowledge deficit for living kinds. For
example, in a previous paper (Roberson et al, 1999), we showed just how accurate LEW could be in
sorting animals into British vs foreign categories. Nor do we wish to argue that LEW provides evidence
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for a dissociation between impaired sensory knowledge and preserved function knowledge independent
of impairments to living kind categories.
We would rather consider LEW to exemplify the types of categorisation task performed well or badly by
aphasic patients; arguments raised earlier by the Konstanz group. However, to remove further doubt, we
will present evidence that LEW has considerably preserved knowledge about the visual form of animals
even for the type of judgement (colour) that he could only perform at chance in the odd-one-out task.
Experiment 8: Intact Visual Knowledge
Roughly half of the errors that LEW made on the odd-one-out task concerned the colours of animals. In
consequence, LEW was given the test developed by Davidoff and Warrington (1999) to assess visual
knowledge of animals.
Stimuli and Procedure
The test consists of three sections (colour, parts and shapes); these were administered in that order with
two-hour intervals between sections. The test consists of 30 items plus two practice items presented as
high quality photographs. For each item, the subject is asked to point to the correct of three alternatives.
All the items consisted of the correct animal with two distracters produced in Photoshop from digital
versions of the originals. For the parts section, distracters were produced by replacing the correct part
with one from another animal. For the shapes section, distracters were produced by altering the relative
size of the correct parts (see Davidoff & Warrington, 1999 for full details).
In a subsequent session six months afterwards, LEW was administered the colour section of the test in
Davidoff and Warrington (1999) but in a different format. The new format was more similar to that
usually given to assess object-colour knowledge (Lewandowsky 1908/ Davidoff & Fodor, 1989; De
Renzi & Spinnler, 1967). Line drawings similar in style to the Snodgrass and Vanderwart stimuli were
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constructed of the animal stimuli. Next to each of these drawings, in crayon, was a 4cm x 4cm square of
homogenous colour similar to the colour in the original stmuli. In all other ways, the stimuli were
presented in identical fashion to those in Davidoff and Warrington (1999).
LEW was also given a version of a test in Luzzatti and Davidoff (1994) used to assess object-colour
knowledge. The test consists of 16 line drawings of vegetables and fruits. Each stimulus was presented
crayoned in a homogenous wash with the correctly associated colour and incorrectly with three other
colours. LEWÕs task was to point to the correctly coloured stimulus. One item was omitted as LEW
indicated that he did not recognise the stimulus.
Results
For the animal test taken from Davidoff and Warrington (1999), LEWÕs performance on this difficult
test was at the level of age-matched controls (see Table 4) and, if anything, better for colour than the
other two sections. LEWÕs performance on the part and shape sections is, at least, at the level of 15-
year-old children (Davidoff & Roberson, 2002). LEW was not disadvantaged by the change in format
for the colour section now scoring 28/30 correct.
                         Table 4 about here
LEW made 5 errors on the four alternative forced-choice task taken from Luzzatti and Davidoff (1994).
He pointed to a yellow rather than a green artichoke, a red rather than a brown peanut, a red rather than
an orange pumpkin, a yellow rather than a green courgette and a green rather than a purple aubergine.
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Discussion
LEW shows rather good knowledge about the appearance of animals. In particular, he showed excellent
knowledge of object-colour despite his inability to carry out the odd-one-out colour task. Furthermore,
his ability to retrieve the correct object-colour was as good from an isolated patch as it was from a
coloured photograph. Thus, the poor taxonomic classification for colour found in Experiment 7 does not
result from a defective store of object-colour knowledge.
LEWÕs performance on the tasks concerned with object-colour shows similarity to the cases described
by Beauvois and Saillant (1985) and it is worth pointing to the similarities but also to the important
differences. LEW shows what might be thought remarkably good performance on the animal colour task
given his abysmal performance on the odd-one-out task that contained many items that concerned
animals. Similarly, Beauvois and Saillant (1985) showed that optic aphasics might demonstrate little
ability to retrieve object-colour knowledge when asked in the normal fashion (De Renzi & Spinnler,
1967); yet, they could be made to show normal performance with other procedures. The particular
procedures used by Beauvois and Saillant to show normal performance concerned the inhibition of
verbal associations. When their patients were allowed to use their visual imagery uncontaminated by
verbal associations, they showed excellent retrieval for object-colour. Beauvois and Saillant (1985)
argued that their cases were examples of optic aphasia caused by a visual-verbal disconnection. LEW
certainly does not fit the normal pattern of an optic aphasic (see Druks & Shallice, 2000) not least
because his performance on the odd-one-out task was equivalent from pictures and words. However, the
principal difference from the cases of Beauvois and Saillant (1985) is that LEW is not failing at object-
colour retrieval but at the taxonomic classification of colour.
LEW made a few mistakes on the task of pointing to the correctly coloured vegetable. His knowledge
about vegetables is not obviously impaired (Druks & Shallice, 2000); nevertheless, it could be possible
34
that the errors were to items that were a little unfamiliar to him. However, rather than familiarity per se
causing the errors, we would think it more likely that the errors reflect the occasions when LEW
attempts a verbal classification rather than relying on his visual memory. If for example, he remembers
grapes as green, he would then have to match the word ÒgreenÓ to the four colour patches; a task that he
finds difficult.
Overview Part3
Part 3 investigated LEWÕs inclination to sort thematically rather than taxonomically. In Experiment 6,
we found that LEW behaved rather like a 4-year-old child in the extent to which he would classify
thematically. LEW, like young children, would change to taxonomic choices if asked to classify by
name.
Inhelder and Piaget (1964) in their pioneering studies of the development of thought questioned the
young childÕs ability to think taxonomically. They noted that children form groups of tokens into images
or geometric structures rather than in groups that follow rules. In fact, LEW behaved with tokens in very
much the same way and we noted that Goldstein made similar comment about his patients (see
Roberson et al, 1999, p 11). The critical concern is whether LEW is incapable of taxonomic
classification or rather whether the experimental conditions prevent the expression of his abilities. For
example, it cannot be assumed that LEW (or a child) really believes that cow and milk are in the same
taxonomic relation as cow and dog simply because he puts them together in the Markman and
Hutchison task (Experiment 6). Thus LEW could merely be vulnerable to the many ways that task
demands might encourage or discourage taxonomic choices.
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The employment of taxonomic choices by children can be encouraged in other ways than the procedure
of adding labels (Markman & Hutchinson, 1984) used in Experiment 6. Requests for identity decisions
(Osborne & Calhoun, 1998; Waxman & Namy, 1997), the use of real objects (Deak & Bauer, 1996), the
spatial aspects of the task (Markman, Cox & Machida, 1981) and the use of nouns rather than relational
language (Dunham & Dunham, 1995) all enhance the proportion of taxonomic decisions. So, it could be
that with different tasks and instructions, LEW could show preserved taxonomic skills. Nevertheless,
the only evidence we have that LEW possesses any taxonomic abilities is from Experiment 6 and this
only shows that LEW can point to different exemplars that correspond to a given label.
Experiment 7 allowed further consideration of the two ways (thematically or taxonomically) of
performing matching tasks. For colour and size odd-one-out tasks, thematic associations are largely
irrelevant. The tasks require an abstract classification; this is almost always true for colour and mostly
the case for size. Of course, the odd-one-out colour task could also be solved by simply naming the
object-colour (e.g., red) but this is not something LEW can do. Thus, we would claim that the odd-one-
out task for colour, and partly also for size, requires a different procedure than merely inspecting visual
memories. So, the fact that LEW has good retrieval of visual object-colour memories (see Experiment 8)
does not help him in the odd-one-out task. He performs better on the function task because, though it
could be seen as a taxonomic task (which is not a tool etc), it can also be performed by thematic
associations. It is only to the extent that the thematic procedure is useful Ðand it often is- that LEW will
achieve good performance.
General Discussion
The present examination of LEW places his previously documented impaired perceptual categorisation
(Roberson et al, 1999) into a context of preserved functions. In particular, the new data reinforce the
view that taxonomic classification is dissociable from other category sorting tasks. LEW can apparently
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make sophisticated classifications (e.g., British vs foreign) but these we argue, in his case, to be
thematic rather than taxonomic classifications. LEW has also retained some ability to reason by analogy
but this does not allow him to succeed in any taxonomic classification.
LEW resembles the type of patient described by Goldstein (1948) who pointed out two characteristics
that amnesic (anomic) aphasic patients adopt in categorisation tasks. First, they do not put the
categorised items into piles but rather require them all to be visible. Goldstein interpreted this behaviour
as an indication that the categorisation was not being driven by an abstract concept. LEW shows exactly
this behaviour for the tasks described above and also for the perceptual categorisation tasks in Roberson
et al (1999). Second, aphasic patients form idiosynchratic categories. LEW would go wrong in a few
object categorisation tasks by basing his classification on his personal knowledge. He, for example, put
a shirt with chest-of-drawers presumably based on where they would be kept in his house.
LEWÕs profile of preserved and impaired function casts some light on three important and related issues.
The first of these concerns a debate about different types of thought processes (Fodor, 1998a; Gentner &
Medina, 1998). The second concerns the role of preserved naming in taxonomic classification; the third
concerns the type of patient who would show similar disorders of taxonomic classification. Turning to
the first of these issues, Fodor (1998a,b) has argued that concepts Ðof the taxonomic kind- cannot be
derived empirically. In contrast and in support of an empiricist position, Gentner and colleagues have
shown that similarity judgements can be affected by object similarity and hence argue that similarity
may bootstrap the acquisition of rule-based skills. Our data are more amenable to FodorÕs view of the
innateness of concepts than the empirical stance of Gentner though, of course, that issue is not directly
addressed. LEW is susceptible to the same distractions as are children in his analogical reasoning but
nevertheless, like children, he is also somewhat immune from them. The important point is that children
at the same level of analogical reasoning as LEW perform very much better at taxonomic tasks. Thus,
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LEW shows that the ability to make taxonomic classifications does not depend on the ability to reason
analogically.
Our data also address the contrast between concrete and abstract thought. Abstract concepts are
essentially of the taxonomic type and concrete concepts essentially thematic though the distinctions are
not always straightforward. Consider, for example, an apple. Abstract (taxonomic) classification of an
apple would be as a fruit. Concrete (thematic) classification of an apple could relate it to another object
(e.g., tree). However, two types of fruit (apple and banana) might be classified together by virtue of their
being seen together just as LEW classifies animals as foreign because they are in the zoo. Thus, an
apparently taxonomic decision can, in fact, be based on a thematic decision. A similar complexity can
arise for thematic classification. The fact that an apple is red might be considered a concrete property of
an apple. Nevertheless, if the decision to classify an apple is based on redness, then it is a taxonomic
decision and one that, in Experiment 7, we saw that LEW failed abysmally.
There are three views about how concrete and abstract concepts might be mentally represented. One
suggests that they have essentially the same mental structure except that abstract concepts are more
complex (see Breedin, Saffran & Coslett, 1994 for review). The second holds that multiple
representations for concrete events make that type of knowledge easier to access. A particularly
important variant of this view holds that concrete events may be stored in both visual and verbal forms
whereas abstract concepts can only be represented in a verbal form (Paivio, 1971). There is
neuroimaging evidence in favour of concrete and abstract meaning being on a continuum (Martin-
Loeches et al, 2001) but equally there is also neuroimaging evidence in favour of multiple sites for
concrete meaning (West & Holcombe, 2000) or abstract meaning (Kiehl et al, 1999). The third view
suggests that abstract and concrete concepts are different in kind; this view appears to have currency
only within neuropsychology and, as Breedin et al (1994) report, largely ignored elsewhere.
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The best neuropsychological evidence for distinctly separable concrete and abstract concepts is that they
are known to double dissociate in naming studies. Aphasics, in general, show a concreteness advantage
in word retrieval (Goodglass, Hyde & Blumstein, 1969) but not always (Goldstein, 1948; Warrington,
1975; Warrington & Shallice, 1984; Sirigu, Duhamel & Poncet, 1991; Breedin et al, 1994). For
example, WarringtonÕs patient could define an abstract word such as supplication as Òmaking a serious
request for helpÓ but could give no definition for the word alligator. Their separation is also confirmed
from a study in which there was a selective difficulty in retrieving abstract words without an impairment
in comprehension (Franklin, Howard & Patterson, 1995); thus ruling out damage to knowledge
structures as causal for an impairment for abstract terms. A similar conclusion was drawn for two
patients where the retrieval deficit was limited to written production (Baxter & Warrington, 1985; Hillis,
Rapp & Caramazza, 1999). Of course, abstract words are generally less frequent, longer etc but these
too have been shown insufficient to explain their difficulty in an anomic patient (Henaff Gonon,
Bruckert & Michel, 1989). The taxonomic difficulty will be seen especially for perceptual terms, such as
colour, because these are essentially abstract. Colour, for example, only allows for taxonomic
classification. For colour, there are not alignable differences (Markman, 2001) or thematic confusions;
hence their particular difficulty in categorisation tasks.
We now turn to the second issue that is addressed by LEWÕs pattern of performance. While we have
argued that LEWÕs data do not support GentnerÕs view that taxonomic classification might be derived
from analogical reasoning, they do support GentnerÕs view for an important role for language in
classification. Gentner contends that language is essential for directing attention to the important
stimulus variables used in the acquisition of rule-based behaviour. In fact, we argue that one aspect of
language (i.e., naming) is even more critical in classification than the role proposed for it by Gentner.
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The relationship between naming and categorisation is not straightforward  (Hampton, 2001; Sloman,
Malt & Fridman, 2001). The complexity arises because of the many ways that objects may be
categorised (decided to be similar). For some tasks, perceptual similarity may be the dominant
procedure for categorisation; for other tasks, it could be some functional or contextual similarity. The
consequence is that there may be categorisation tasks, including sorting, that for normal individuals are
not effected by the names given to objects (Sloman et al, 2001). However, naming and the associated
verbal coding are critical to performance in other tasks. For example, in research on eye-witness
testimony, the detrimental effects of verbal coding are well-known (Loftus, 1979). Verbal coding of
visual stimuli can be automatic (Schiano & Watkins, 1981) with the consequence that existing visual
codes may even be lost (overwritten) after naming (Loftus, 1979; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990).
Effects of name dominance can be equally striking after brain damage allowing a patient to produce
gestures or drawings that correspond to verbal mistakes rather than to the object presented (Oxbury,
Oxbury & Humphrey, 1969; Lhermitte & Beauvois, 1973; Beauvois et al, 1978; Davidoff & Wilson,
1985; Ohtake et al, 2001). These effects are so dramatic as to suggest that it is not only memory codes
that are altered by naming but also the processing of current visual stimuli. A similar claim has recently
made for perceptual categorisation (Davidoff, 2001). We, therefore consider LEW in the context of his
loss of naming.
The naming of objects in aphasia is multi-determined (for recent review see Hillis, 2001) and there are
many contributing factors towards an inability to name objects. One of these factors is an impairment
resulting from damage to semantics or features of object-knowledge (Katz & Fodor, 1963; Hillis, 2001).
Semantic errors in comprehension are generally associated with semantic impairments in naming
(Gainotti et al, 1981) but Butterworth, Howard and McLoughlin (1984) caution against making a direct
link between the two disorders. LEW does not make a substantial number of semantic errors and we
would wish to rule this out as a major cause of LEWÕs naming disorder. Impaired semantics also cannot
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be the reason that LEW prefers to make thematic decisions in categorisation tasks. Semantic errors in
comprehension and naming may accompany preserved thematic associations (Howard & Orchard-Lisle,
1984) but this is not the case for LEW. For LEW, there was a limited ability to name objects but when
given a description of an objectÕs features and functions, his naming showed some improvement (Druks
& Shallice, 2000) prompting the claim that LEWÕs impairment does not stem from a weakened
knowledge base. Their conclusion is reinforced from the results of Experiment 8.
Druks and Shallice argue that LEWÕs naming impairment for concrete objects is at a separate post-
semantic stage of word retrieval (Butterworth, 1989; Levelt, 1989) concerned with lemma selection
(Kempen & Huijbers, 1983). However, Butterworth et al (1984) explicitly state that these operations act
as transcoding devices based on learned associations and not as rule-governed devices. Thus, even
granted that impaired lemma selection does contribute towards LEWÕs naming difficulties, we still need
to consider his inability to name what are, in effect, abstract terms such as colours (e.g., red) and shapes
(e.g., square).
A disorder that prevents naming would at the very least promote associative (thematic) rather than
taxonomic procedures for categorisation. One reason would be the general inclination to solve
categorisation tasks verbally (Ashby et al, 1998) and this would be particularly the case for complex
multidimensional stimuli. However, it is not the case that LEWÕs categorisation difficulties are only
present for complex stimuli. LEW has difficulties in categorising even the simplest of perceptual
stimuli. For these, observation by itself is insufficient to arrive at a categorical solution (Anderson &
Fincham, 1996) and therein lies LEWÕs difficulty. For such classifications, the concept and the name are
in effect the same thing and LEW is without names to assist the categorical solution. Where patients
such as LEW can name, they can categorise. In an odd-one-out task in which LEW could successfully
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name each item, he would succeed just as he could succeed when given names in the Markman task
(Experiment 6).
We argue that LEWÕs poor naming ability is critical to the loss of taxonomic classification. Indeed, for
patients with selective category disorders (note for example the classic dissociations in Goodglass et al,
1966) one might predict preserved taxonomic abilities only for those categories with preserved naming.
However, it must be said that, at present we do not have direct evidence of the taxonomic abilities of
patients whose naming loss results from semantic disturbances. Nevertheless, the data available
(Semenza, 1999) might prompt the conclusion that, even here, there would be impairments with
taxonomic classification.
With respect to the third issue, clearly related to the second issue, concerning the types of patient that
would exhibit similar disorders, we would first note they ought not to be rare. With Goldstein, we
suggest that disorders of taxonomic classification would be common because naming disorders are
common. They may appear less common than they are because so many sorting tasks are soluble by
thematic associations. It is only for perceptual categorisations that the taxonomic failure becomes vivid
because, for those tasks, there is no other way to the solution. However, before restricting a taxonomic
impairment to a naming disorder, it is necessary to rule out other likely candidate populations that might
be argued to show the same sort of deficit.
The type of aphasic patient that would show disorders of taxonomic classification has to be one in which
language impairment is central. One would not expect impairments of perceptual categorisation where
there is merely a problem in production such as shown in the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon. Indeed,
previous research on the impaired perceptual categorisation abilities of aphasic patients has eliminated
those with more anterior damage (de Renzi et al, 1972, Caramazza et al, 1982). So, the least likely
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candidate patients are those whose problems involve the syntactic elements of language however
essential they are to linguistic theory. Impaired sentence comprehension is demonstrable in patients with
good word comprehension (Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; von Stockert & Bader, 1976) and preserved
syntax co-exists with naming impairments (Hodges, Patterson & Tyler, 1994). Furthermore, Varley,
Siegel and Want (2001) have shown that severe grammatical impairment does not preclude many
abstract reasoning tasks such as theory of mind or playing chess.
Having ruled out impairments associated with anterior lesions as responsible for taxonomic impairment,
we now rule out other disorders associated with more posterior damage. The locus of lesion critical for
taxonomic classification is the left posterior cortex (Caramazza et al., 1982). The laterality of the lesion
makes it unlikely that we would want to consider the data of Caramazza et al (1982), or our own, as
evidence for a nonverbal semantic impairment (Chertkow et al., 1997). In any case, LEW exhibits the
same poor taxonomic classification in Experiment 7 for both visual and verbal presentations (see
McCarthy & Warrington (1988) for a classic example of when that does matter). The types of patient
that might seem better candidates are those that have degraded or inaccessible knowledge stores
(Warrington, 1975); a disorder often referred to as semantic dementia (Snowden, Goulding & Neary,
1989). Such patients often demonstrate loss of naming and, indeed, difficulty with taxonomic as
opposed to thematic relationships (Semenza et al, 1980). However, the generally intact knowledge store
of LEW (Druks & Shallice, 2000) does not prevent him making taxonomic errors; clearly the disorders
must be different. The same conclusion was drawn by Franklin et al (1995) in considering the selective
impairment of the production of abstract words. One is, therefore, driven to the view that applying a
name to a class of objects is a theoretically different ability to associating features in object-knowledge.
Though here Goldstein (1948) warned of difficulties of interpretation if the naming was by rote (in his
word, pseudonaming), rather than reflecting an abstract attitude.
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One aspect of knowledge loss deserves further comment. In its severe form, such patients may only be
able to retrieve superordinate information such as ÒanimalÓ or ÒmetalÓ (Warrington, 1975). The
resilience of superordinate information could be due to its early acquisition (Mandler, 1994), the perhaps
consequent increase in frequency with which the labels are attached to the object (Funnell, 1995) or
because there are natural domains of knowledge (Konorski, 1967; Warrington, 1981; Caramazza &
Shelton, 1998). If such domains form natural categories, their mental representations should be available
for taxonomic decisions at least between these broad categories. We do not doubt that LEW could
successfully classify items into animals vs tools. So, we cannot be adamant that LEW is incapable of
making all taxonomic decisions. However, such natural divisions are not available for categories within
domains that form continuous variables such as colour or shape; for the inability to make categorical
distinctions for these variables we need to look elsewhere.
The critical impairment for LEW we argue to be his anomia but he has lost more than just the names.
He, like other patients with colour anomia (Davidoff & Ostergaard, 1984; Davidoff, 1991), also cannot
point correctly to a named colour and also cannot benefit from shape category labels in Experiment 1.
LEWÕs loss, as Goldstein put it, is that of an abstract attitude. LEWÕs impairment makes him unable
consciously to allocate items to perceptual categories. Hence, we regard his impairment to refer not to a
type of knowledge store but to a type of thought.
In summary, we suggest that there are two types of categorisation procedures (taxonomic and thematic)
that have separable mental representations. In attempting to distinguish the two types and understanding
the processes underlying categorisation, the major problem is that classification (family resemblance) of
objects (animals, tools etc) could be obtained from visual similarity, by common habitat, size or a
myriad of other associations. It could be even argued that these associations are what constitute the
category. Our central thesis is not concerned to demonstrate problems with these thematic types of
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category. Aphasics may turn out to be over or under inclusive in the features of objects that for them
define a category (Grossman, 1978, 1981) or be completely normal except for difficulties derived from
word retrieval (Hough, 1993).  Our thesis is that there is a type of classification, independent of feature
classification, unavailable to aphasics with naming disorders.
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Nouns Verbs
Correct Wrong Correct Wrong
Means Std Err Means Std Err Means Std Err Means Std Err
FK Frequency   76.62    14.27    61.67 9.12  100.75    25.21    77.08    11.00
Familiarity     4.01 0.22 3.88 0.14 3.83 0.35 4.02 0.15
Age of Acquisition     2.44 0.10 2.51 0.07 2.53 0.17 2.56 0.07
Imageability     5.85 0.08 5.84 0.05 4.50 0.14 4.20 0.06
Visual Complexity     3.75 0.20 3.38 0.13 4.17 0.19 4.24 0.08
Table 1. Correct and wrong naming responses for LEW on The Object and Action Naming battery of
Druks and Masterson (2000) analysed by the mean score on 5 variables.  Frequency scores are taken
from Francis and Kucera (1982). Other scores are based on answers to 7-point scales (1 = lowest) from
around 40 informants.
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                No Labels            Family Labels      Size  Labels
Sparse  Rich Sparse  Rich       Sparse  Rich
LEW  72%   57%  60%   50%          86%     78%
R&G (1998)
3-year-olds  54%   32%  89%   79%
4-year-olds  62%   38%    -     -
5-year-olds  95%   68%    -     -
Table 2: Percentage correct scores for LEW compared to the developmental data from Ratterman &
Gentner (R&G) on analogical reasoning tasks.
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                                         PICTURES                                         WORDS
                            Colour      Size      Function               Colour      Size      Function
LEW                      24            52            81                       24            57   67
Controls                 86            85            85                       81            78            82
Standardisation
Sample
Accuracy               88            83            86       90            83   83
Latency (msec)   3203        2995        3289                    3751        3148        3878
Table 3: Accuracy (Percentage correct) scores for LEW and 12 matched controls in odd-one-out tasks.
Accuracy and latency scores are also given for the standardisation sample (N = 12). There were 21
triads in each condition.
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                          NAMING        SHAPE             FEATURE       COLOUR
LEW                          0                         73                  73                 87
CONTROLS        100                     83              78            83
Table 4: Naming and correct recognition performance (percentage correct) for LEW and Controls in the
animal recognition task taken from Davidoff and Warrington (1999). Control scores (N = 10) are from
the original paper. The task consists of 30 items in each condition.
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Figure 1. The 3 prototype shapes (square, circle, triangle) and 6 transformations used in experiment 1. (a) prototype (b) gap;
(c) line-to-curve; (d) single line extended; (e) two-lines extended; (f) irregular figure; (g) freehand.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)   (f)   (g)
squares
triangles
circles
63
Figure 2. Examples of sparse and rich sets of stimuli used in experiment 3.
                  Sparse Rich
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Figure 3. Examples of sparse and rich sets of abstract stimuli used in experiment 4.
                        Sparse Rich
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